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ETHICAL ISSUES IN TAX PRACTICE
James P. Holden
Michael C. Durst
Shirley D. Peterson, Moderator
I. Introduction* -- Recent years have seen dramatic changes in
rules governing whether a tax practitioner may advise a client to
take a particular position on a return. The basic problem is a
result of the "audit lottery": because of the government's
far-from-perfect ability to audit positions taken on returns, the
self-assessment system requires standards of some kind to limit
positions that taxpayers, and hence their advisers, can take. It
is exceedingly difficult, however, to devise rules articulating
clearly what the limitations should be. The applicable rules,
therefore, can be very difficult to apply in practice.
II. Sources of the applicable rules -- The "law" governing
practitioners in formulating return positions derives from a
number of sources. Perhaps most important are the civil penalty
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, discussed below,
governing both taxpayers and "income tax return preparers." Tax
professionals also typically are subject to the rules of state
licensing authorities, such as state bars and accountancy boards.
These state regulatory bodies, in turn, typically base their
rules on model codes of conduct of national organizations, such
as the ABA and AICPA. In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department
has statutory authority, under 31 U.S.C. S 330, to establish
disciplinary standards for persons practicing before it. These
standards are set forth in Treasury Circular 230 (31 C.F.R. part
10). The IRS Director of Practice and his staff enforce the
rules of Circular 230 on behalf of the Treasury. For a handbook
of the rules governing tax practitioners, see the two-volume set
by B. Wolfman, J. Holden & K. Harris, Standards of Tax Practice
(CCH Tax Transactions Library).
III. Two Steps in Applyin the Rules: Identifying the
Applicable Standard. and Applying Any Disclosure Exceptions --
The discussion below explains the rules governing return
preparation, first by describing the development of the various
standards (e.g., "realistic possibility of success" and
"substantial authority") that govern advice concerning positions
on returns, and then by describing the circumstances in which
special disclosure on the return will permit the taking of
positions that do not meet the standards.
* This outline has been prepared by Michael C. Durst.
Copyright 1991, 1992, 1993, Michael C. Durst.
IV. Rise and Fall of the "Reasonable Basis/Reasonable
Support" Standard
A. ABA and AICPA standards. 1965-1985 -- Until relatively
recently, tax practitioners subscribed to the "reasonable
basis," or "reasonable support," test in assessing
practitioner conduct.
1. ABA Formal Opinion 314:1 "[A] lawyer who is asked
to advise his client in the course of the preparation of
the client's tax returns may freely urge the statement
of positions most favorable to the client [without
specifically disclosing the position on the return] just
as long as there is reasonable basis for those
positions."
2. Former AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax
Practice No. 10 (superseded): A CPA "may . .. . resolve
doubt in favor of his client as long as there is
reasonable support for his position."
3. Reasonable basis rouqhly consistent with
"nealiaence" standard -- The reasonable basis/reasonable
support test probably was consistent with the standard
traditionally applied under the then-existing taxpayer
"negligence or disregard" penalty of I.R.C. section
6653(a), and the related "preparer" penalty of section
6694(a).
a. Section 6653(a), versions of which had been in
the Internal Revenue Code since the 1920s, imposed
a taxpayer penalty for "negligence or disregard of
rules or regulations." (The section 6653(a)
penalty has largely been retained in current law
under newly enacted Section 6662, as described
below.)
b. Section 6694(a) imposed a penalty on preparers
for "negligent or intentional disregard of rules
and regulations." (Section 6694 was revised
substantially in 1989, as described below.)
B. Introduction of "substantial authority" in 1982 -- A
turning point in attitudes toward return positions came with
1 ABA Formal Opinion 314, which was promulgated in 1965, has
been superseded insofar as it applies to advice in connection
with the preparation of returns, although it has not been
superseded to the extent it provides guidance governing
representation of taxpayers in audits and other adversary
proceedings..
the enactment, in 1982, of a new taxpayer "audit lottery"
penalty. The penalty, formerly contained in Code section
6661, and now reincorporated in the Code as part of section
6662, is described further below. The provision generally
imposes a penalty on individual and corporate taxpayers whose
returns contain "substantial understatements" of income tax
liability, unless there is "substantial authority" for the
position taken in the return, or unless the position is
"adequately disclosed." A "substantial understatement,"
under current law, is an understatement that --
exceeds the greater of --
(i) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown
on the return for the taxable year, or
(ii) $5,000.
The legislative history of the 1982 Act made clear that the
new "substantial authority" standard in the taxpayer penalty
was intended to be more demanding than the traditional
"reasonable basis" standard:
The standard of substantial authority was
adopted, in part, because it is a new
standard. . . . The conferees believe such a
standard should be less stringent than a "more
likely than not" standard and more stringent
than a "reasonable basis" standard. Thus, it
is anticipated that this new standard will
require that a taxpayer have stronger support
for a position than a mere "reasonable basis"
(a "reasonable basis" being one that is
arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail in
court upon a complete review of the relevant
facts and authorities). Rather, when the
relevant facts and authorities are analyzed
with respect to the taxpayer's case, the
weight of the authorities that support the
taxpayer's position should be substantial when
compared with those supporting other
positions.
1982 Act Conference Report, reprinted in 1982-2 C.B. 600,
650. The new penalty had the effect of placing on taxpayers
for the first time a significant risk of penalty for
aggressive return positions that had been approved by
practitioners.
C. Ensuing debate concerning whether the "substantial
authority" standard for taxpayers established morally binding
standard that governed both taxavers and practitioners --
Following enactment of the new "substantial authority"
penalty, a debate ensued among practitioners and academics,
essentially over the question whether the new standard was
intended to be morally binding on taxpayers and
practitioners, or whether the provision instead established a
mere "user fee" under which the taxpayer is free to take a
position without substantial authority and without
disclosure, so long as the taxpayer is willing to risk the
penalty. Compare, e.g., Letter from B. Wolfman to L.
Shapiro, reprinted at 39 Tax Notes 832 (1987); with Durst,
The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 1027 (1987).
D. ABA and AICPA adopt "realistic possibility of success"
standard -- Ultimately, both the ABA and the AICPA issued
revisions to their standards for return preparation. Both
the ABA and AICPA opinions rejected the notion that the new
taxpayer standard of "substantial authority" was intended to
be morally binding on either taxpayers or practitioners.
Instead, the ABA and AICPA established for practitioners an
entirely new, "realistic possibility of success" standard.
1. ABA Formal Opinion 85-352: Permits statement of
position if the position is taken in good faith and has
"some realistic possibility of success if the matter is
litigated." The opinion makes clear that "some
realistic possibility of success" does not require
"substantial authority." (Formal Opinion 85-352 is
printed at 39 Tax Lawyer 631 (1986)).
2. AICPA's 1988 Revised Statement on Responsibili-
ties in Tax Practice (No. 1): Permits advising a
position if there is a "good faith belief that the
position has a realistic possibility of being sustained
administratively or judicially on its merits if
challenged." In addition, even if a position does not
meet the "realistic possibility" standard, a CPA may
take the position so long as it is "not frivolous," and
"the position is adequately disclosed on the return or
claim for refund."
3. What is a "realistic" possibility of success? ABA
Tax Section Task Force Report:
A position having only a 5% or 10% likelihood
of success, if litigated, should not meet the new
standard. A position having a likelihood of
5success closely approaching one-third should meet
the standard. Ordinarily, there would be some
realistic possibility of success where the position
is supported by "substantial authority".
Sax, Holden, Tannenwald, Watts & Wolfman, Report of the
Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 Tax
Lawyer 635, 638-39 (1986).
E. Treasury proposes, but ultimately withdraws, disciplinary
rule based on "substantial authority" -- Historically,
Circular 230 has had no specific standards governing advice
in connection with returns, instead containing only a general
requirement of "due diligence." In 1986, the IRS proposed
amending Circular 230 to the effect that practitioners could
be subject to discipline for knowingly advising positions
that would violate the taxpayer "substantial authority"
standard of section 6662 (then 6661). 31 Fed. Reg. 29,113
(Aug. 14, 1986). The proposal evoked a strongly negative
response from practitioners, and the Treasury never finalized
it.
V. 1989 Act Penalty Reform -- After considerable study among
academics, practitioners and the IRS, Congress enacted the
Improved Penalty and Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT) as part of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989.
A. Negligence-or-disregard and substantial authority
penalties retained as part of new "accuracy-related penalty"
-- Congress in 1989 generally reenacted the taxpayer
"negligence or disregard" and "substantial understatement"
penalties of prior law, as part of a new "accuracy related"
penalty in newly enacted Code § 6662. (Please note that
S 6662, and for that matter other provisions of the Code,
contain numerous penalties and special rules in addition to
those discussed here. This outline is intended to provide an
overview of recent developments governing return preparation,
rather than provide a comprehensive account of the Code's
penalty provisions. Note, for example, the taxpayer penalty
under § 6662(e) for substantial valuation misstatements.)
B. Congress adopts "realistic possibility of success"
standard as part of revised return preparer penalty -- As
part of IMPACT, Congress also substantially revised the
return preparer penalty of S 6694. Sections 6694(a) and (b),
as amended in 1989 and retained unchanged to date, provide:
(a) UNDERSTATEMENT DUE TO UNREALISTIC
POSITIONS. -- If --
(1) any part of any understatement
of liability with respect to any return
or claim for refund is due to a position
for which there was not a realistic
possibility of being sustained on its
merits,
(2) any person who is an income tax
return preparer with respect to such
return or claim knew (or reasonably
should have known) of such position, and
(3) such position was not disclosed
as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B) (ii)
[dealing with the substantial
understatement penalty] or was frivolous,
such person shall pay a penalty of $250 with
respect to such return or claim unless it is
shown that there is reasonable cause for the
understatement and such person acted in good
faith.
(b) WILLFUL OR RECKLESS CONDUCT. -- If
any part of any understatement of liability
with respect to any return or claim for refund
is due --
(1) to a willful attempt in any
manner to understate the liability for
tax by a person who is an income tax
return preparer with respect to such
return or claim, or
(2) to any reckless or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations by any
such person,
such person shall pay a penalty of $1,000 with
respect to such return or claim. With respect
to any return or claim, the amount of the
penalty payable by any person by reason of
this subsection shall be reduced by the amount
of the penalty paid by such person by reason
of subsection (a).
The 1989 House Committee report notes:
The committee has adopted this new standard
because it generally reflects the professional
conduct standards applicable to lawyers and to
certified public accountants. The committee
believes that this standard of behavior is
stricter than present law, so that negligent
behavior subject to penalty under present law
will continue to be subject to penalty under
the new standard.
H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1396 (1989).
Caution: "Intentional" disregard of rules or regulations
need not be done with an evil intent. Thus, a challenge to a
regulation can invoke the penalty under § 6694(b) even if the
practitioner believes the challenge is likely to be
successful. However, the penalty can be avoided through
disclosure, as described further below. Under the current
penalty regime, as described further below, such disclosure
is essential if a regulation is to be challenged in a return.
C. Congress' action drives "wedge" between practitioner.
taxpaver standards -- Congress' 1989 action raises a
fundamental practical problem, which continues to affect
practitioners and their clients. The "realistic possibility
of success" standard governing practitioners is, apparently,
stricter than the "negligence" standard that, in many
instances, remains the reporting standard governing
taxpayers. Thus, tax professionals are in some instances
barred from assisting clients in taking positions that the
clients are legally free to take on their own. Is this
situation desirable? See generally Durst, supra, passim;
Zelenak, Reforming Penalty Reform: Congress Should Eliminate
the Profusion of Accuracy Standards, 52 Tax Notes 471, 474
(1991).
D. Treasury incorporates the preparer standard of "realistic
possibility of success" standard in proposed revisions to
Circular 230 -- On October 8, 1992, the Treasury proposed
revisions to Circular 230 which would, if adopted, subject to
discipline practitioners who advise positions that do not
meet the "realistic possibility" standard, unless disclosure
requirements are met (see below). Proposed 31 C.F.R.
S 10.34, 57 Fed. Reg. 46356 (Oct. 8, 1992). Discipline will
be imposed only for violations "that are willful, reckless,
or a result of gross incompetence." Because this proposal
simply incorporates the standard of the statutory return
preparer penalty, it should be noncontroversial. (Other
areas of the proposed Circular 230 rules which are not under
discussion here, such as rules governing contingent fees in
tax practice, have proven more controversial and are likely
to be revised.)
VI. Some Highlights of IRS Guidance Under the Penalty Provisions
A. Meanings of the applicable standards
1. Practitioners' "ballpark" views of Rercentages
associated with reasonable basis/negligence. substantial
authority standards -- Probably, most practitioners have
associated the reasonable basis/negligence standard with
about a 10-to-20 percent probability of success. It is
not clear that the notion of probability is relevant to
an "objective" standard such as the taxpayer
"substantial authority" standard, but many practitioners
seem to associate it with about a 40 percent probability
of success. (For further discussion of quantification
of the various standards, see Banoff, Determining Valid
Legal Authority in Advising Clients. Rendering Opinions.
Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 68 Taxes
40 (1990).
2. Treasury associates one-in-three probability with
realistic possibility of success -- Following the lead
of the ABA Tax Section task force report quoted above,
the Treasury has associated the realistic possibility of
success standard for practitioners with a one-in-three
likelihood. Section 1.6694-2(b)(1) of the regulations
provides:
A position is considered to have a
realistic possibility of being sustained
on its merits if a reasonable and
well-informed analysis by a person
knowledgeable in the tax law would lead
such a person to conclude that the
position has approximately a one in
three, or greater, likelihood of being
sustained on its merits (realistic
possibility standard). In making this
determination, the possibility that the
position will not be challenged by the
Internal Revenue Service (e.g., because
the taxpayer's return may not be audited
or because the issue may not be raised on
audit) is not to be taken into account.
The regulation's incorporation of a one-in-three
likelihood has been controversial.
3. "Authorities" taken into account in determining
whether one-in-three likelihood exists --
Section 1.6694-2(b) makes clear that, in determining
whether a one-in-three likelihood of success exists,
those items considered "authorities" for purposes of the
taxpayer substantial understatement penalty should be
taken into account.
B. Disclosure
1. Disclosure rules vary considerably among the
different penalties -- Disclosure rules under the
substantial understatement and negligence-or-disregard
portions of the taxpayer accuracy-related penalty differ
considerably. Disclosure rules under the preparer
penalty contain pitfalls. In addition, disclosure rules
for taxpayers have been changed very recently, in the
1993 Reconciliation Act.
2. Substantial understatement penalty -- The taxpayer
"substantial understatement" penalty has always had a
statutory disclosure "out" (except with respect to
positions attributable to "tax shelters").2 Under pre-
1993 law, disclosure of any position (other than one
associated with a "tax shelter" could avoid the
substantial understatement penalty (although taxpayers
might still be subject to the negligence-or-disregard
penalty). In 1993, however, Congress amended section
6662(d)(2)(B) to provide that disclosure will provide
protection from the substantial understatement portion
of the taxpayer accuracy-related penalty only if the
position has reasonable basis. Thus, Congress has
breathed new life into a standard that was almost
extinguished in 1989.
3. Form of disclosure under substantial understatement
Denalty
a. Old regulations allowed several forms of
disclosure -- Under prior guidance, disclosure
under the taxpayer substantial understatement
penalty was adequate if it was made either on a
Form 8275 attached to the return, or on the return
itself. The IRS has issued a series of annual
revenue procedures specifying certain kinds of
positions with respect to which disclosure would be
deemed made simply by filling out applicable
returns and schedules (e.g., Schedule A with
respect to charitable or medical deductions). See
Rev. Proc. 92-23, 1992-13 I.R.B. 21; Rev. Proc. 93-
33, 1993-28 I.R.B. 49. Prior regulations were
unclear whether disclosure of an item not on Form
2 As described below, however, taxpayers avoiding the
substantial understatement penalty by disclosure might still have
been subject to the negligence-or-disregard penalty.
8275, but rather "on the return," could be
considered adequate even if the item was not listed
in the Service's revenue procedure. The Tax Court
held under prior law that such disclosure can be
sufficient in some circumstances, and the IRS
acquiesced in that view. See Schirmer v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 277 (1987), aca. on issue of
disclosure under § 6661, 1989-1 C.B. 1.
b. Current reaulations do not permit disclosure
"on the return." except as provided by the
Service's annual revenue procedure -- The current
regulations provide that items not mentioned in the
Service's annual revenue procedure can be disclosed
only on the IRS's special disclosure forms.
Moreover, in what may be an excess of regulatory
detail, the IRS now provides two disclosure
forms -- a regular Form 8275 for general use, and a
Form 8275-R for use when a position taken is
contrary to a regulation.
c. Qualified amended returns -- Both the old and
new regulations permit disclosure, for purposes of
the substantial understatement penalty, to be made
on a "qualified amended return" (generally, an
amended return filed before the IRS contacts the
taxpayer for audit, although special rules have
been provided for large taxpayers in the
coordinated examination program). See generally
Reg. SS 1.6662-4(f), 1.6664-2(c)(2), (3).
4. Disclosure under the taxpayer negligence-or-
disregard Penalty -- Disclosure under the "negligence or
disregard" penalty has a somewhat more complicated
background.
a. Disclosure may not have provided protection
from pre-1989 taxpayer negligence-or-disregard
penalty -- Traditionally, practitioners believed
that disclosure of a questionable position, except
in extreme cases, provided a taxpayer with
protection against the penalty for "negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations." See Coustan &
Banoff, supra, at 361. In Druker v. Commissioner,
697 F.2d 46, 52-56 (2nd Cir. 1982), however, the
Court of Appeals, overruling the Tax Court,
indicated that disclosure would not avoid the
penalty when the taxpayer took a position directly
contrary to a regulation. The court determined
that, historically, Congress had enacted the
"disregard" portion of the penalty as a "no-fault"
toll charge for the privilege of taking a
questionable position in a return, and then
defending the position before actually paying the
tax.
b. Congress provides disclosure "out" in 1989 --
The 1989 Act specified, in a new section 6664 of
the Code, that all of the taxpayer accuracy-related
penalties in section 6662 are subject to a
"reasonable cause and good faith" exception, and
the 1989 legislative history indicated that this
exception would be available with respect to a
nonfrivolous position that was disclosed plainly on
the return. The legislative history stated:
The committee believes that the
application of standardized exception criteria
to the negligence component of the
accuracy-related penalty will result in
several consequences that are beneficial to
taxpayers . . . [T]he complete,
item-specific disclosure of a non-frivolous
position on a tax return may generally be
considered to permit an exception from the
negligence penalty insofar as such disclosure
would tend to demonstrate that there was not
intentional disregard of rules or regulations.
Disclosure must be full and substantive,
parallel to the disclosure required under the
substantial understatement component of the
accuracy-related penalty; completing and
filling in a tax form is by itself
insufficient disclosure for this purpose. In
addition, the disclosure must be clearly
identified as being made to avoid the
imposition of the accuracy-related
penalty. . . . (T]he application of
standardized exception criteria to the
negligence component of the accuracy-related
penalty may also permit a taxpayer to avoid
imposition of that penalty where the taxpayer
makes a good-faith challenge to the validity
of an IRS regulation, if the taxpayer
discloses (in the manner just described) that
the taxpayer is taking the position and makes
specific reference to the regulation being
challenged. As under present law, frivolous
challenges to IRS regulations would be subject
to penalty.
H.R. Rep. No. 247, supra, at 1393. The
"nonfrivolous" standard generally is consistent
with legal ethical rules governing when positions
can properly be taken in litigation.3 Regulations
issued under the 1989 Act define a "frivolous"
position as "one that is patently improper." Reg.
S 1.6662-3(b) (3).
c. Congress arQuablv tiQhtens disclosure under the
negligence-or-disregard penalty in 1993
i. In 1993, when Congress tightened
disclosure under the substantial
understatement penalty as described above,
Congress also indicated in legislative history
that disclosure could avoid the negligence-or-
disregard penalty only with respect to a
position for which there is "reasonable
basis.''4 The conference committee report
indicates that "'reasonable basis' (is
intended to] be a relatively high standard of
tax reporting, that is, significantly higher
than 'not patently improper."'
ii. It is unclear whether this legislative
history has the force of law, because neither
the Finance Committee's version of the 1993
Act, nor the Act as ultimately passed,
actually amends the negligence-or-disregard
component of the accuracy-related penalty.
3 ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law.
4 The 1993 Senate Report provides:
Under the bill, a taxpayer can avoid a substantial
understatement penalty by adequately disclosing a return
position only if the position has at least a reasonable
basis. Similarly, a taxpayer can avoid the penalty that
applies to disregarding rules or regulations by
adequately disclosing a return position only if the
position has at least a reasonable basis. The
disclosure exception is no longer relevant with respect
to the penalty for negligence, because a taxpayer
generally is not considered to have been negligent with
respect to a return position, regardless of whether it
was disclosed, if the position has a reasonable basis.
iii. If the legislative history is followed
(perhaps through amended IRS regulations under
section 6662), taxpayers will be precluded,
even with disclosure, from taking certain
nonfrivolous positions which would, under
applicable rules governing standards in
litigation, be litigable in Tax Court. Thus,
the only way for a taxpayer to assert a
nonfrivolous, but non-reasonable basis,
position would be to file a refund request and
pursue the claim in the district court or the
Court of Federal Claims.
d. Procedures for disclosure under the negliQence-
or-disreqard Penalty -- Based on the 1989
legislative history, the Treasury has set forth
demanding standards for disclosure under the
taxpayer negligence-or-disregard penalty.
i. Disclosure must be made on IRS forms -- To
avoid the negligence or disregard penalty,
disclosure must be made on either a Form 8275
or Form 8275-R. The rules described above
that, for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty, permit disclosure on
the return in some cases pursuant to an annual
revenue procedure, do not apply to disclosure
for purposes of the negligence-or-disregard
penalty. This fact greatly diminishes the
usefulness of making disclosure on the return
under the revenue procedure.
ii. Revenue rulinqs as "rules or regulations"
-- There has been some controversy whether
revenue rulings constitute "rules" within the
meaning of the words "rules or regulations."
The regulations resolve this question in
Solomonic fashion. Under the regulations,
"[t]he term '[r]ules or regulations' includes
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
temporary or final Treasury regulations issued
under the Code, and revenue rulings or notices
(other than notices of proposed rulemaking)
issued by the Internal Revenue Service and
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin."
Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2). However, the
regulations indicate that the Service will not
impose a penalty for an undisclosed position
contrary to a revenue ruling or notice if the
contrary position has a realistic possibility
of being sustained on its merits. Reg.
S 1.6662-3(a). Thus, the regulations do not
subject undisclosed positions in disregard of
revenue rulings or notices to the "no-fault"
disclosure standard that applies to
undisclosed positions in disregard of
regulations.
5. Disclosure under the return preparer penalty can
involve pitfalls.
a. Section 6694(a) -- In order for a preparer to
avoid the penalty under § 6694(a) for positions
without a "realistic possibility of success," the
taxpayer need only make disclosure of the kind
sufficient to avoid the substantial understatement
component of the accuracy-related penalty. Thus,
disclosure on the return, pursuant to the Service's
annual revenue procedure, will suffice. Reg.
S 1.6694-2(c).
b. Section 6694(b) -- However, the penalty under
S 6694(b), which is misleadingly labeled "Willful
or Reckless Conduct," applies, among other things,
to "intentional disregard of rules or regulations."
Thus, a preparer who advises even a good-faith
challenge to a regulation could fall within this
penalty. Only disclosure by the taxpayer in a form
adequate to protect against the
negligence-or-disregard component of the
accuracy-related penalty will suffice to protect a
preparer from application of this penalty. Reg.
S 1.6694-3(e). Disclosure according to the
Service's annual revenue procedure therefore will
not suffice. (As is true under the taxpayer
negligence-or disregard penalty, a position
contrary to a revenue ruling or notice need not be
disclosed by the taxpayer in order for the preparer
to avoid penalty if the position has a realistic
possibility of success).
c. The 1993 Finance Committee bill proposed, but
Congress ultimately rejected. a provision that
would have reguired "reasonable basis" for
disclosure to be effective under the return
preparer penalty -- The version of the 1993 Act
originally passed by the House, as well as the
Senate Finance Committee version of the Act,would
have recognized disclosure by the taxpayer as an
exception to the return preparer penalty only with
respect to a position that has reasonable basis.
This would have raised a special problem, because
the return preparer penalty, unlike the taxpayer
negligence-or-disregard and substantial
understatement penalties, is applicable to claims
for refund as well as returns. Thus, practitioners
would have been barred entirely from assisting
taxpayers in taking some litigable positions. This
amendment to the return preparer penalty was,
however, eliminated from the Senate bill during
floor consideration on a "point of order," and the
conference committee accepted the Senate version of
the bill. Thus, the preparer penalty remained
unchanged by the 1993 legislation.
d. Non-signing preparers
i. In many circumstances, a practitioner will
be a "preparer" by virtue of having provided
advice with respect to a substantial portion
of a return, but, because another person
prepares the bulk of the return, the
practitioner will not be the preparer required
to sign the return. Cf. I.R.C.
SS 7701(a)(36) (defining "income tax return
preparer"); 6695(b) (setting forth return
signature requirement). A nonsigning preparer
might be providing advice directly to a
taxpayer, or indirectly through another
preparer.
ii. The regulations indicate that a
nonsigning preparer can satisfy disclosure
obligations by notifying the taxpayer or the
other preparer, as the case may be, that
disclosure should be made (or, in appropriate
cases, that a substantial understatement
penalty may be applied if disclosure is not
made). Reg. § 1.6694-2(c) (3) (ii),
1.6694-3(e)(2). The regulations indicate
that, if the underlying advice given is in
writing, the advice with respect to disclosure
must be in writing, and if the underlying
advice is oral, the advice with respect to
disclosure may be oral as well. However, the
question whether the advice actually has been
given is a question of fact, and the
regulations indicate that "[c]ontemporaneously
prepared documentation of the oral advice
regarding disclosure (or the oral advice
regarding possible penalty under
section 6662(d)) generally is sufficient to
establish that the advice was given to the
taxpayer." The moral of the story: keep
careful written records of all advice
concerning disclosure.
6. Note on disclosure under ABA Formal Opinion 85-352
-- As indicated above, the AICPA's ethical guidance
contains an explicit "disclosure out" for nonfrivolous
positions; indeed, § 6694(a) is modeled after the AICPA
approach. ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, however, is silent
on the question of a disclosure out. The opinion simply
states that a lawyer can state a position without
disclosure if the position has a realistic possibility
of success. Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 Tax Lawyer at
633-34. In light of the subsequent penalties
legislation, however, a practitioner who advises a
taxpayer to take a disclosed position having reasonable
basis should not violate Formal Opinion 85-352. Cf. B.
Wolfman, J. Holden & K. Harris, supra, at 214.0242.
38936.1
